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Reduction
(detente)
in the Soviet-American relations in 70th years appeared short-lived. At
the end of this decade on change to it came a new aggravation of intensity
and again "cold war". Who bears for it the responsibility? USA or Soviet
Union? The American historians assign the basic fault to the USSR, its
external and internal policy. Our historians of times of existence of
Soviet Union, in turn, practically unanimously blamed for all United
States, their policy and actions. The Russian researchers, appreciating
the new approach to all former official concepts, have started with not to
blame smaller effort for the entire former mode which is taking place at
authority in the USSR. Put actually was much more difficultly. One is
clearly: all process of dismantle reduction
(detente)
has grown out of development and a difficult interlacing of the various
internal political and foreign factors working in both countries. Let's
try to summarize and analyze some of these factors briefly.
1. A principal cause of failure with reduction
(detente)
during this period was existence of irreconcilable contradictions between
the state ideologies of the USSR and USA and different approaches to
reduction
(detente).
The Soviet management, no less than administrations Nixon - Ford - Carter,
never tried to call in question the own argument. The rate on reduction
(detente)
was carried out in parallel with expansion of military and diplomatic
activity in "the third world". Thus at both countries completely various
vision of development of a global history and the place in it was kept,
and their thinking remained basically confront able.
2. The beginning of reduction
(detente)
has coincided on time with coming to power Nixon and Kissinger. At all
their indisputable merits in becoming a detente in relations from the USSR
they had no some more the ready and thought over concept of reduction
(detente),
and the more so the endings of "cold war". 3.
Administrations of Nixon, Ford and Carter, changed each other, did not
adhere to a consecutive rate on reduction
(detente),
and the concept of reduction
(detente)
was understood by them is inconsistent and is ambiguous. 4.
The camp of supporters in USA practically did not operate as a uniform
coalition while opponents were well organized and operated actively.
5. The big damage to business of reduction
(detente)
has put events in "the third world" (Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, Yemen and
Afghanistan). 6.
The internal political rear of a detente in USA was undermined by "Watergate"
scandal that has sharply lowered ability of administration of USA (Nixon
and Ford) to carry out a consecutive rate in the Soviet-American relations.
7.
A serious economic crisis of 1974-1975 years has played the role. 8.
A policy of restriction of emigration from the USSR, prosecution of
dissidents and the excesses connected to it, have received a loud public
resonance in the West, and caused the big damage to process of reduction
(detente).
Absence of wide contacts between parliaments and the public of both
countries, and also in trading, cultural and scientific areas interfered
with formation of material and sociopolitical base of reduction
(detente). It
prevented searches of an outcome in rather emotional sphere for both
countries - around of a problem of human rights - and neutralizations of
many stereotypes of "cold war". On the contrary,
misunderstanding of each other only amplified. 9.
The important factor in undermining of in the Soviet-American relations
played also that circumstance, that it depend on process of restriction of
strategic armaments more and more, that is it had rather narrow base for
development of cooperation. 10.
The general conclusion comes from here: military reduction
(detente) there could not
be one without of political reduction
(detente). And absence of a strong political
consensus in USA for the benefit of support of reduction
(detente) was one of
principal causes of its failure.
A value of reduction
(detente)
in 70th years should not be underestimated. It has shown first of all the
world absence of fatal inevitability continuous confront oppositions of
two superpowers, two sociopolitical systems. It has considerably reduced
risk of nuclear collision. The major agreements were made and serious
arrangements on military questions are achieved in this period. Process of
negotiations on restriction of strategic armaments all was included into
the agenda of relations of both powers more strongly. All this was,
undoubtedly, success both American, and the Soviet foreign policy.
But, unfortunately, reduction 70th years
(detente)
appeared not only incomplete, but also fragile, short-lived. There
is one more important circumstance. The western politicians perceived
Brezhnev in 1970-1974 years as the person who is able to a message the
international affairs and negotiations and which aspired to the world and
arrangements. In second half 70th years the foreign heads met with
Brezhnev, saw before themselves already other person. Brezhnev grew
decrepit, he was any more in a condition to give former strong-willed
pulses for the benefit of reduction, and it too has sped up its decline.
And reduction
(detente), it is necessary to tell; it was movable by personal
ambitions of the general Secretary, as well as the American Presidents, in
large degree. Unfortunately, except for the presidency of Nixon, there are
recognized necessity of regular meetings for more frank exchange of
opinions and the possible mutual account of sights and interests
insufficiently in both capitals. Carters
coming to power in 1977 was accompanied by significant complications and
aggravations in the Soviet-American affairs, unsuccessful attempts of
administration to practice selective or dosed out reduction
(detente). A unjustified
delay with end of the contract about OSV-2 (which and was not ratified by
the American party), public confrontation around of a question on human
rights, switching of attention of Carter on other problems, including
activity of connections with China, was removed with the Soviet-American
relations back on a scale of foreign priorities of the White house, while
ideological and political pressure upon the USSR with the purpose to
achieve changes in its external and internal policy was kept. The Carter's
actions considered by the Soviet management as direct intervention in
internal affairs of the USSR caused special irritation in Moscow. All
this - in a combination to a rough course of events in the world in
1977-1979 years at unjustified confront involving in both of them of
powers and, at last, the Soviet intervention to Afghanistan - marked
disorder of a detente in the Soviet-American relations and returning to
"cold war". |
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